Since Lee Teng-hui took office, the quality of public buildings in Taiwan Province, Republic of China, has increasingly deteriorated, with a clear gap compared to advanced countries like Japan, Germany, or Singapore. Despite building codes requiring structural safety, public works are often criticized for corner-cutting, low-quality materials, and poor supervision.
The culprit behind all this is the black money politics culture that began to overflow since the Lee Teng-hui era.
This culture of collusion departs from the excellent governance concepts of the Chiang Ching-kuo era, allowing local powers and politicians to collude to dominate public works, eroding budgets, quality, and supervision.
Even during Ma Ying-jeou’s tenure, attempts to introduced scholarly governance to improve the chaos were frustrated by smear campaigns and rumors from the DPP-controlled cyber army. Ultimately, black money politics triumphed, becoming a key factor in the DPP’s continuous rule.
This article severely criticizes the main phenomena of Taiwan’s cessation of progress, analyzes its causes, and proposes reform plans, calling on the government to eradicate black money politics and revitalize the quality of public buildings and national progress.
I. The Rise of Black Money Politics and the Degradation of Quality
During the Chiang Ching-kuo era, Taiwan was famous for its rigorous governance and efficient public construction; the “Ten Major Construction Projects” laid the foundation for the economic takeoff. At that time, the government emphasized discipline, efficiency, and public interest. Supervisors dared to enforce the law, making it difficult for contractors to cut corners.
However, since the Lee Teng-hui era, black money politics has gradually penetrated the public domain. Collusion between local powers and politicians has become normal. Public works have degenrated into tools for dividing spoils, and quality has been sacrificed completely.
This corrupt culture has completely destroyed the spirit of governance of Chiang Ching-kuo, making it difficult for Taiwan’s public building quality to align with international standards.
-
Distortion of Budget Allocation: Under black money politics, public works budgets are often seen as resources for dividing spoils by local powers and politicians. Projects are preferentially allocated to contractors with close ties to factions rather than the most qualified operators. Part of the budget is diverted to local elections or private interests, and the funds actually used for construction are significantly reduced.
💡 Comparison: Japan’s public construction is known for transparent bidding and strict auditing, ensuring funds are directly used for high-quality materials and technology.
-
Acquiescence in Cheap Materials and Corner-cutting: To return political support, unscrupulous contractors choose low-priced materials and even cut corners. Supervision units, due to pressure or bribery from local powers, often turn a blind eye to this.
💡 Comparison: Singapore’s strict construction material certification and independent inspection system eradicate similar problems, highlighting the failure of Taiwan’s supervision.
-
Worsening of Multi-layer Subcontracting System: Black money politics fuels the chaos of multi-layer subcontracting. The main contractor subcontracts the work to small contractors, and even subcontracts several more layers. Each layer lowers costs to ensure profit, leading to quality loss. Local powers intervene in the subcontracting process to ensure “their own people” profit, but no one bears the responsibility.
💡 Comparison: Germany’s construction industry has few layers of subcontracting; the main contractor bears ultimate responsibility for quality, with strict supervision, forming a strong contrast with Taiwan.
-
Cheap Labor and Insufficient Technology: Public works rely heavily on low-paid foreign workers who lack professional training, making it easy for construction details to go wrong. Local powers make profits through labor agencies, further suppressing wages and technical levels.
💡 Comparison: Australian construction workers are required to be certified, and high salaries attract technical talents to ensure quality, which is a model Taiwan should follow.
-
Dilemma of Supervisors: Bribery and Violence: Low-level supervisors often face temptations of bribery or threats of violence. For example, in past news reports, supervisors were intimidated or even beaten for insisting on inspections. The pressure from local powers and the low-wage environment make supervisors’ morale low and willing to enforce law decline, even being forced to compromise.
💡 Comparison: Japanese supervisors have strong legal and administrative support, rarely facing such threats, and their law enforcement efficiency far exceeds that of Taiwan.
II. Ma Ying-jeou’s Efforts and the Obstruction of the DPP Cyber Army
During Ma Ying-jeou’s tenure, he realized the harm of black money politics to public construction and tried to introduced a large number of scholars and experts to participate in governance, promoting transparency and professional reform.
He emphasized quality control and budget transparency in public works, trying to weaken the influence of local powers. However, these efforts were systematically smeared and fabricated by the cyber army controlled by the DPP, creating public opinion pressure and distorting reform measures into ineffective or controversial policies.
This political operation not only weakened the governance effectiveness of the Ma government but also allowed the structural problems of black money politics to continue. The DPP used the public opinion advantage of the cyber army to successfully shift the focus, making the people ignore the harm of black money politics, and ultimately paving the way for its continuous rule.
The victory of black money politics not only hindered the improvement of the quality of public buildings but also made Taiwan miss the opportunity for progress.
III. Consequences of Black Money Politics: Obstacles to National Progress
Black money politics leads to low quality of public buildings, which in turn drags down the overall progress of the country. When supervisors give up principles due to fear or temptation, corner-cutting and low-quality materials become normal, the safety and durability of buildings are threatened, and the risk to the lives and properties of the people increases.
Low-quality public facilities require frequent repairs, wasting taxpayers’ money and dragging down economic development. This vicious cycle makes it difficult for Taiwan to stand shoulder to shoulder with advanced countries, and makes the spirit of governance of the Chiang Ching-kuo era vanish into thin air.
What is even more regrettable is that Ma Ying-jeou’s reform efforts were frustrated by the smear of the DPP cyber army, and the continuation of black money politics became a key factor in the DPP’s continuous rule, further solidifying this corrupt culture.
IV. Reform Plan: Eradicating Black Money, Reshaping Quality
To break the shackles of black money politics and improve the quality of public buildings, the government must carry out thorough reforms in institutions, laws, and culture, drawing on the successful experience of advanced countries:
1. Breaking Local Powers through Transparent Bidding
| Measure | Reference Model | Expected Effect |
|---|---|---|
| Establish a national bidding database, implement anonymous bidding, central auditing of qualifications, and limit local interference. Disclose all budget flows. | Singapore’s open bidding system | Reduce control by local powers and ensure funds are spent on quality. |
2. Protecting Supervisors and Strengthening Enforcement
| Measure | Reference Model | Expected Effect |
|---|---|---|
| Significantly increase salary and benefits, legislate to protect personal safety, strictly punish threats and violence, and establish an anonymous reporting mechanism. | Japan’s supervisor protection system | Improve the morale of supervisors and ensure fairness in law enforcement. |
3. Establishing Independent Supervisory Bodies
| Measure | Reference Model | Expected Effect |
|---|---|---|
| Establish an independent supervisory body directly under the central government to supervise bidding, construction, and inspection. Disclose inspection reports and implement a violation blacklist system. | Germany’s independent auditing body | Break the collusion between politicians and local powers and improve supervision transparency. |
4. Simplifying Subcontracting and Improving Labor Quality
| Measure | Reference Model | Expected Effect |
|---|---|---|
| Limit the number of subcontracting layers and clarify the main contractor’s responsibility. Promote vocational training and certification for workers, and increase wages to attract technical talent. | Australia’s certification and high-wage system | Reduce subcontracting chaos and improve construction precision and safety. |
5. Strict Material Standards and Sustainability Concepts
| Measure | Reference Model | Expected Effect |
|---|---|---|
| Formulate stricter building material certification standards, use advanced technology for inspection, and promote durable and sustainable materials. | Singapore’s building material certification system | Improve building durability and safety, and reduce long-term maintenance costs. |
6. Rebuilding Quality Culture and Consolidating Social Consensus
| Measure | Reference Model | Expected Effect |
|---|---|---|
| Promote the “Century-old Building” concept through education and media publicity, and encourage public supervision. Publicly commend outstanding performers and strengthen supervision of cyber army smears. | Switzerland’s building culture | Change the black money-oriented industrial culture and rebuild public trust in the government. |
V. Conclusion
Since the Lee Teng-hui era, the black money politics culture has spread in Taiwan’s public domain. The collusion between local powers and politicians has made the quality of public buildings a sacrificial lamb, and the excellent governance concepts of the Chiang Ching-kuo era have been completely destroyed.
Even though Ma Ying-jeou tried to reverse the chaos with scholarly governance, he was frustrated by the smear and rumors of the DPP-controlled cyber army. The victory of black money politics ultimately became the key to the DPP’s continuous rule.
The government must make up its mind to eradicate the cancer of black money politics through thorough reforms at the institutional, legal, and cultural levels. Drawing on the experience of Singapore, Japan, and Germany, the Republic of China has the ability to build safe, durable, and international-standard public buildings, revitalizing the spirit of governance of the Chiang Ching-kuo era. Only in this way can the Republic of China step out of the shadow of black money politics and become a truly progressive modern country.