Introduction
In contemporary Taiwanese society, a notable phenomenon is the strong emotional attachment some citizens display toward Japan, often viewing it as a cultural or spiritual “motherland.”
This pro-Japanese sentiment is frequently seen in online forums, political commentaries, and specific social circles, manifesting as high praise for Japanese history, culture, and politics. However, this sentiment is limited to a minority of Taiwanese people; it creates an impression of being widespread only because its volume is significantly amplified on media and internet platforms.
Based on historical accounts—that many Japanese who gained immense wealth during the colonial period stayed behind by falsifying household records and assuming local identities after WWII—this article explores how this concept influenced identity formation among a few and why their voices carry such weight.
Furthermore, this article analyzes the impact of post-war land reforms on pro-Japanese vested interests, the lingering effects of the Kominka (imperialization) movement, and the prominence of these phenomena in central and southern Taiwan. By incorporating contemporary case observations, we can see how this sentiment persists through family heritage and interacts with the current political environment.
The Legacy of the Japanese Colonial Period
From 1895 to 1945, Japan occupied Taiwan by force, incorporating it into the Empire. This era brought infrastructure, educational reform, and economic development, but was also accompanied by resource exploitation and cultural assimilation policies.
Many Japanese moved to Taiwan for administration, commerce, or land development, with some accumulating substantial wealth in the process. Following the end of WWII and the retrocession of Taiwan to the Republic of China (ROC), Allied forces ordered the repatriation of approximately 480,000 Japanese nationals.
However, rumors persist that a small number of Japanese, who had “profited immensely by exploiting the Taiwanese” during the colonial era, chose to hide their identities, adopt Taiwanese names, and forge household registrations to avoid repatriation and potential retribution.
Some cases suggest these individuals bribed household registration officials to complete their identity shifts, primarily to protect family assets acquired during the occupation, such as specific mountain lands or related industries.
During this period, Japan also promoted the Kominka movement, forcing Taiwanese people to identify with the Japanese Empire, receive Japanese-language education, adopt Japanese names, and participate in war mobilization. This policy not only strengthened a sense of Japanese identity for some but also triggered identity crises and resentment following Japan’s defeat.
Additionally, many local Taiwanese landlords thrived under the colonial tenancy system, becoming deeply integrated into the colonial economy and forming a vested interest class.
Realities and Rumors of Post-War Japanese Residencies
Historical records show that a small number of Japanese did remain in Taiwan legally or semi-legally due to marriage, technical necessity, or other reasons—numbering from several hundred to a few thousand. These residents mostly lived low-profile lives and integrated into local society. Their descendants or associated families may have privately passed down positive memories of Japan, including nostalgia for the order, discipline, and modernization of the colonial era.
For instance, certain family oral histories suggest that “stay-behind” Japanese bribed officials to alter records, preserving assets like mountain resorts in central Taiwan. These families often hid their origins for decades, only revealing their Japanese ancestry in recent years as the political climate shifted toward a pro-Japanese stance (particularly under Democratic Progressive Party administrations).
Because their numbers are so small, this group does not represent the mainstream of Taiwanese society. However, some descendants or those influenced by them entered education, media, culture, or politics, gaining high social visibility and a platform to speak.
Their pro-Japanese views are consistently amplified through books, lectures, social media, and political stances, creating a “volume effect” that leads outsiders to believe such sentiments are universal in Taiwan. In modern cases, some younger descendants not only inherit this affinity but also display strong anti-KMT and anti-ROC positions, sharing family histories on social media and identifying as “Spiritual Japanese” while choosing to study in Japan—a reflection of the intersection between heritage and personal identity.
Analyzing the Causes of the High Volume of the Pro-Japanese Minority
Based on these concepts, the influence of post-war Japanese residents and their descendants can be seen as one of the sources of Taiwan’s pro-Japanese sentiment, albeit within specific circles. These individuals or families often chose to stay low-profile during turbulent post-war periods (such as the White Terror) but gradually began expressing their Japanese identity after the lifting of martial law. This identity merged with local consciousness and political stances, echoing loudly in specific media and online communities.
In this context, the post-war land reforms—particularly the “Land to the Tiller” policy—served as another critical factor. Between 1949 and 1953, the ROC government implemented land reforms, transferring land from large landlords to tenant farmers through rent reductions and compulsory purchase.
While this policy improved the welfare of farmers, it severely damaged the status of the local landlord class that had benefited under the Japanese. Many landlords who built wealth in the colonial economy viewed the land reform as a strike against local power by the KMT, fostering resentment toward the ROC. This bitterness was often passed down to descendants, forming a psychological basis for pro-Japanese sentiment and the idealization of the Japanese colonial era as a period of “just” rule.
Furthermore, the lingering effects of the Kominka movement cannot be ignored. In the late colonial period, Taiwanese people underwent forced assimilation, developing a sense of pride in their “Imperial Subject” status. After Japan’s defeat, this pride turned into loss and resentment, which some directed at the ROC government that took over Taiwan. Early post-war governance failures (such as the February 28 Incident) amplified these emotions, causing a minority to look to Japan as a spiritual home.
These phenomena are especially evident in central and southern regions (such as Tainan, Chiayi, and Kaohsiung). These areas had vast agricultural lands where colonial-era landlords were concentrated; thus, the impact of land reform was more severe, leading to deeper grievances against the KMT. Additionally, the Kominka movement penetrated deeper into rural central and southern Taiwan, making the post-war identity conflict more pronounced.
Key reasons for the loud volume of this minority include:
- Media and Internet Amplification: Pro-Japanese remarks easily gain high exposure and shares on specific forums, YouTube channels, and social media, with algorithms further boosting visibility.
- Cultural and Political Positioning: Some pro-Japanese individuals hold positions as intellectuals, artists, or political commentators, providing them with more channels to speak.
- Contrast Psychology: Against the backdrop of tense Cross-Strait relations, idealizing Japan as a symbol of resistance against mainland threats resonates emotionally with certain groups, expanding their influence.
- Reshaping Colonial Memory: Compared to negative experiences under post-war KMT rule, the Japanese colonial period is selectively interpreted by this group as relatively progressive and mild.
In reality, the attitude of most Taiwanese toward Japan is one of rational appreciation (e.g., enjoying Japanese travel, food, and pop culture), rather than “motherland” worship. Those who hold intense pro-Japanese identities or “Spiritual Japanese” stances remain a minority, though their extreme expressions—such as an almost antisocial hatred of the ROC—often stem from the entanglement of family history and personal experience.
Conclusion
While rumors of Japanese residents hiding their identities post-war involve numbers that are historically limited and often exaggerated, they provide a lens through which to understand the roots of intense pro-Japanese sentiment in a small segment of the population. Combined with the impact of land reform on the descendants of landlords, the identity resentment born from the Kominka movement, and the regional characteristics of central and southern Taiwan, these factors have created a “volume effect” far exceeding the actual number of people involved.
However, the essence of this phenomenon remains the amplification of a minority position rather than a mainstream consensus in Taiwanese society. Through historical facts and rational analysis, we can more clearly distinguish between loud rhetoric and actual distribution, avoiding generalizations and deepening our understanding of Taiwan’s diverse identities.