Understanding the Service Trade Agreement: The Sunflower Movement’s Cheap Justice
A friend asked: “Why do you support the Service Trade Agreement?”
I replied: “I don’t particularly support it.” Pausing, I added: “But I genuinely cannot support the Sunflower Movement’s anti-service trade activities.”
Service trade represents necessary compromise—economic pragmatism rather than ideological preference.
The movement’s opposition lacks factual justification. Despite reviewing extensive “lazy summary” arguments against the agreement, I cannot identify compelling reasons supporting their opposition.
Distinguishing the Movement
I must clarify: The occupiers of the Legislative Yuan are civic activists conducting social movement, not students conducting a student movement. They crossed ideological lines requiring them to accept responsibility, hence deserve recognition as conscientious civic actors—even if their actions prove misguided.
The “Black Box” Claim
Anti-agreement protesters claim the 30-second vote constitutes “black box procedure” and procedural illegality. However, that procedure merely converted the agreement from “standing review” to “filing status”—both are legally valid methods under cross-strait agreements law.
All substantive negotiation occurred previously over extended periods. That 30-second vote simply formalized already-completed work. Even extending it to three hours wouldn’t change anything—the only action was the gaveling.
Who’s Responsible for Obstruction?
Numerous pre-signing legislative briefings occurred. After signing, both parties agreed to clause-by-clause review. The DPP refused review from June through March.
Who truly obstructed the people’s interests—the party governing through legislative majority, or the opposition party refusing review?
The Service Trade Content
Industry experts confirm the 24 substantive clauses align with WTO standards and remain reasonable. The real issue involves supplementary industry opening conditions.
Negotiation requires accepting unfavorable items to gain favorable ones. Supporting measures became essential but were deprioritized to accelerate goods trade negotiations, generating legitimate concerns.
The Hong Kong Comparison
Some claim Hong Kong’s cross-strait opening exceeds Taiwan’s, citing supposedly missing limitations in Taiwan’s proposal. However, I cannot locate Hong Kong’s specific service commitment schedule—only vague governmental language about future negotiations.
Regarding product-specific comparison: The CPC8676 industry (restaurants, bars) shows both mainland China and Taiwan opening with zero restrictions—identical terms.
For tourism CPC7471: Taiwan permits mainland Chinese sole proprietorships operating only “Taiwan domestic tourism within Taiwan” with maximum three locations. Conversely, the mainland permits Taiwan service providers unlimited expansion with conditions identical to mainland enterprises.
Taiwan negotiated better terms than Hong Kong.
The Real Problem
The core issue isn’t the agreement itself but Taiwan’s legislative quality and procedural integrity. Whether through direct government line-item review or DPP challenge before the Constitutional Court (Constitutional Interpretation #329 clarification), the procedural questions deserve resolution through constitutional mechanisms rather than extraconstitutional occupation.
Using extraconstitutional pressure to force constitutional issues creates enormous social costs.
The Economic Imperative
Here lies the crucial point: Service trade is necessary, with goods trade following. South Korea simultaneously negotiates both with mainland China, gaining FTA status. Taiwan’s delayed approach risks competitive disadvantage.
When Taiwan exporters face 5% tariffs while Korean competitors pay zero, procurement decisions become obvious. 2,000 Taiwanese manufacturing products—from semiconductors to socks—would be affected across 18,000 Carrefour-equivalent product categories.
Taiwan has negotiated 4-5 years since initial 2009 proposals. On this timeline, 30 seconds remains negligible compared to actual negotiation duration.
Student Demands vs. Reality
The government offered public legislative sessions with student representatives. Anti-agreement activists insisted on presidential apology instead of problem-solving.
This revealed their true goal: political theater, not resolution.
The Anti-China Motivation
Throughout social network discussions, I consistently reach the same conclusion: “You’re not anti-service trade. You’re anti-China.”
Some honestly acknowledge this. Others defensively claim “It’s not that extreme; there are good people in China too.”
As the Empresses in the Palace drama would say: “How theatrical.”
I respect anti-engagement-with-China positions without requiring service trade support justification. But reality shows cross-strait engagement already surrounds you—your colleagues, friends, and even fellow subway passengers represent this daily interaction.
Our concerns about mainland hostility derive from fear—an invisible monster, constantly inflated by psychological pressure, eroding our willpower like creatures emerging from darkness.
I don’t fear mainland military conquest. I don’t fear mainland economic unification because such approaches would generate permanent Taiwanese hostility, creating uncontrollable adversaries rather than cooperative partners.
Maintaining the current status quo represents balanced pragmatism, not ideological surrender.
Concluding Criteria
For engaging this issue, I propose:
- Research before discussing
- Debate respectfully without personal attacks
- Acknowledge procedural legitimacy alongside substantive concerns
Stop consuming “lazy summaries.” Understand the complexity. Then you’ll recognize the service trade neither represents black box procedure nor Taiwan’s capitulation—rather, it reflects difficult but necessary economic navigation in a competitive regional environment.