The author saw on Facebook a certain person using a pseudonym “Ryan Chen” strongly accusing: “The US proposed Taiwan independence, but Chiang’s family rejected it.” It’s obvious as “pointing at a deer and calling it a horse”—he’s clearly trying to spin the narrative saying the US supports Taiwan independence, and that Chiang Kai-shek rejected it for his dictatorial power.
Actually, this kind of rural legend that’s circulated most in Taiwan independence circles is completely wrong!
While everyone was arguing whether Taiwan Province should be independent or unified (to be honest, both are false issues), Chiang Kai-shek’s international maneuvering with the US was nearly the most difficult battle in modern Chinese history after WWII’s Asia-Pacific theater victory. It was not merely bloodshed, but political warfare.
On October 14, the 60th year of the ROC (1971), when China was forced to withdraw from the United Nations, Foreign Minister Zhou Shukai called Taipei from New York asking “If the important question draft is not passed, the US, Japan and I must have an emergency fallback plan to present before the voting on draft A, attempting to salvage it, but this plan must not be disclosed externally until the last moment to avoid affecting current lobbying efforts for the important question draft.” The emergency fallback plan Zhou Shukai reported was the “amendment proposed to the UN by Saudi Arabia.”
The Saudi Arabian Amendment
“The people of the Republic of China, namely the people of Taiwan Island, constituting a separate political entity…The Republic of China, namely the people of Taiwan Island, should retain its seat in the United Nations and within all related organizations, until such time as the people of the Republic of China, namely the people of Taiwan Island, in a plebiscite or general election under UN auspices are able to publicly declare their choice regarding:
- Continued independence as a sovereign nation with a neutral status as determined by a UN-recorded treaty.
- Formation of a confederation with the People’s Republic of China under terms to be decided between the parties.
- Formation of a federation with the People’s Republic of China under a protocol to be negotiated between the parties.”
Vice Foreign Minister Yang Xikun formally told the US on October 20 that the Republic of China could accept the Saudi Arabian amendment. Regarding this “one China, one Taiwan” proposal, Chiang Kai-shek could accept it, precisely to ensure that the Republic of China on Taiwan could survive as an independent sovereign nation.
However, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who had recently visited mainland China, sent four telegrams from Beijing to the White House on October 22-23, firmly opposing the Saudi Arabian amendment as a fallback plan, pointing out that Beijing would least tolerate the Saudi amendment granting Taiwan a “new status.”
If the United States supported this amendment, the foundation of current US-mainland China dialogue would be damaged.
Kissinger told Nixon that if the US continued to propose “Taiwan’s status is undetermined,” or granted Taiwan new legal status in the United Nations, PRC leaders would think the US goes back on its word, seriously damaging the current basis for US-PRC dialogue.
Kissinger warned Nixon to be cautious on the question of China’s UN representation, not to ruin the painstakingly cultivated and hard-won fragile trust foundation between the US and mainland China with futile policy.
It was precisely because of Kissinger’s opposition that the US was unwilling to push forward the Saudi Arabian amendment.
On the evening of October 25, 1971, after the UN General Assembly rejected the US “modified important question draft,” the assembly voted on the Saudi Arabian amendment, which did not receive support from most countries.
So old Chiang could accept it back then, but was rejected by the majority of UN member nations!
Furthermore, don’t forget that the PRC would replace the ROC as a permanent UN Security Council member, possessing veto power with one vote! So even if the “Saudi Arabian amendment” had gained majority support back then, the PRC would absolutely exercise its Security Council power to veto the proposal!